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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BEATRICE N. THOMAS,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

DAVID L. MIDGLEY, MELANIE
MIDGLEY, and JOHN DOES 1-10,

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Case No.

920446-CA

Defendants.

JURISDICTION AND PETITION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated

§

78-2a-3(2)(k).

Appellant

petitions this Court for rehearing under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE PETITION AND RELEVANT FACTS
I.

Statement of the Petition
1.

This is a petition for rehearing from the Memorandum

Decision entered by this Court on January 13, 1993. (See Addendum)
2.

This petition originates from an appeal from a final

Order and Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (See R. 157-59)
3.

The final Order and Judgment was entered on February 13,

1991 after a trial to the bench to the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.
(See R. 157-59)

1

4.

The Findings of Fact upon which the final Judgment is

based were also entered by the trial court below on February 13,
1991. (See R. 146-56)
5.

The Notice of Appeal was filed with the Third Judicial

District Court on the 14th day of March, 1991. (See R. 160)
II.

Statement of the Relevant Facts
This petition incorporates by reference the "Statement of the

Releveant Facts" contained in Appellant's Brief.

SUMMARY OF PETITION
The Court erred in its Memorandum Decision by stating that
Appellant does not appeal from the trial court's decision as to the
$10,150 promissory note.

The Court goes on to state that it need

not address the issue relating to whether the trial court correctly
allowed Melanie Midgley to assert the affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations on behalf of David Midgley.
The trial court

found that the above mentioned

promissory note was valid and enforceable.

$10,150

The trial court,

however, denied the recovery against either David or Melanie
Midgley of any payments that were due more than six years before
the filing of the complaint.

The trial court found that the

statute of limitations pled by only Melanie Midgley barred any
recovery against her and also David Midgley who did not plead the
defense.
Ms. Thomas appealed this decision and the determination that
David Midgley, a different defendant, be protected by the statute
2

of limitation defense pled by another defendant when he did not
plead said affirmative defense.

It is the Appellant's position

that being an affirmative defense, each party must plead the
defense on their own behalf.

If the party fails or chooses not to

plead the defense, as in this case, they are not entitled to the
protection of such defense.
Therefore, the statute of limitations does not bar recovery
for any installment payment due within the six year statute of
limitations period with respect to Melanie Midgley. Simply stated,
the statute of limitation defense protection should not be given to
David Midgley due to the fact that he did not plead that defense.
This Court must address this issue on rehearing and make a
determination as to the statute of limitation defense as it applies
to David Midgley and the $10,150 promissory note.
The Court erred in ruling that no consideration was given for
the $20,000 promissory note signed by David Midgley. Furthermore,
this Court and the trial court failed to address in their decisions
the fact that the Midgleys wrote off the $20,000 on their joint tax
returns indicating that a transfer had taken place.
The shares of stock that were given in exchange for the note
may not have met all the formalities for transfer, but there was a
meeting of the minds as to the transfer and each party acted as if
the exchange was valid.

David Midgley received benefits from the

possession and "ownership" of the stock by writing off $20,000 on
the joint tax returns filed by him and the Melanie Midgley over the

3

next seven years.

There was consideration given for the note and

benefits claimed and realized by the Midgleys from such transfer.
This Court failed to address the trial court's ruling that the
$20,000 note's optional acceleration clause was deemed to have been
exercised.

The trial court's decision is clearly an error of law

and must be reversed.

For an optional acceleration clause to be

activated, the holder of such note must make an affirmative act
before such clause will take effect. The trial court found that no
such act was taken in this case.

Nevertheless, the trial court

found that since the Ms. Thomas had the right to accelerate said
note, she was deemed to have accelerated the note and the statute
of limitations barred recovery against both David Midgley and
Melanie Midgley.
ARGUMENT
I.

DAVID MIDGLEY RECEIVED CONSIDERATION
FOR
PROMISSORY NOTE AND ACCOMPANYING MORTGAGE.

THE

$20,000

The trial court, at the end of the Plaintiff's case in chief
ruled that the $20,000 promissory note was unenforceable against
David Midgley because the statute of limitations had expired. (The
petitioner addresses the issues surrounding this portion of the
decision in Section II of this petition).

At the completion of the

trial, the trial court additionally found that the $20,000 note was
unenforceable

as against David

Midgley

because

there was

"no

consideration for the promissory note since there was no legally
effective

assignment

and/or delivery

of the stock

Harvest Corporation by [Ms. Thomas] to the [Midgleys]."

in Land 0'
This Court

upheld this ruling even though the overwhelming evidence presented
4

at trial and surrounding circumstances indicate that consideration
was given, particularly by David Midgley.
Mrs. Thomas invested $20,000 in Land 0' Harvest, a corporation
of which David and Melanie Midgley were both principals, for which
she received 200 shares of said corporation. (See R. 147)

Mrs.

Thomas and the Midgleys subsequently met with an attorney, Mr. Kent
Larsen, to discuss a way to protect Mrs. Thomas' interest. (See
R.147)

A preliminary agreement was reached by which Ms. Thomas

would assign all of her shares (200) of Land 0f Harvest to David
and Melanie Midgley in exchange for a promissory note together with
a mortgage on the home of the Midgleys to secure the note. (See R.
147)
An

assignment

agreement

was

prepared

together

with

a

promissory note and a mortgage. (See R. 148) Ms. Thomas gave the
stock certificate to the Midgleys. (T. 260-61; 274)

Even though

the

due

Midgleys

had

possession

of

the certificate,

to an

oversight, the stock certificate was never endorsed by Mrs. Thomas.
David Midgley testified that he signed both the promissory note and
the mortgage. (T. 243; 256; Exhibit #27)

Melanie Midgley Short

testified that she signed the mortgage which was used to secure the
promissory note. (T. 142; Exhibit #4)

The mortgage was properly

recorded with the Salt Lake County recorder. (T. 16-17; 258-263)
The trial court stated that the promissory note was valid
against David Midgley and a cause of action arose upon the first
defaulted interest payment. (R. 104)

David Midgley knew of the

exchange of the promissory note for the assignment of stock. It is
5

clear as to the intent of the parties for making such an exchange.
David Midgley benefitted from this assignment by believing and
acting as though he owned the stock.

Notably, he deducted, as

losses, on their joint tax returns, the value of the stock. (See R.
30; Exhibit #12; T. 265-70; 155-56)
David Midgley answered the Complaint and Crossclaim indicating
that the transaction had taken place and he and Melanie Midgley
received benefit. (See R. 30) David Midgley later testified and it
is clearly represented in the tax returns that the stocks were
written off as business losses by both David and Melanie Midgley.
(T. 267-70)
Along the same line of reasoning, Mrs. Thomas, acting upon the
presumption that the assignment was valid, was not able to do the
same. She forfeited her legal right of being able to write off the
losses of stock from her tax returns.
Melanie Midgley claims that there is collusion or potential
collusion regarding these transactions between Ms. Thomas and David
Midgley because of their divorce. This is clearly not the case due
to the fact that all of these transactions occurred while David
Midgley and Melanie Midgley were still married.

The transaction

was made and the stocks were being written off on their joint tax
returns over a period of time exceeding seven years before their
divorce. Such a contention is used only to confuse the true issues
surrounding this case.
In further support of Mrs. Thomas' contention, even if the
trial court were to find that there was no formal assignment and/or
6

delivery, through the meeting of the minds and performance on the
part of both parties, a binding contract was formed.

It has been

held that a contract, although not enforceable, may nevertheless
become valid and binding to the extent that it has been performed;
and after a contract has been executed on both sides the question
of consideration becomes immaterial. 17 C.J.S. Contracts Sec. 71.
By looking at the actions of all the parties involved, it is
clear that even though there may have existed some technical
problems, the intent and understanding of the parties is clear. At
a minimum, both David Midgley and Mrs. Thomas intended for such
transfers to occur and proceeded to act as if such had occurred.
Both parties acknowledge that the transaction occurred.
30, T. 16-17; 247; 256; 286-87)

(See R.

David Midgley did receive

possession of the stock. (T. 260-61; 274) Thereafter, he wrote off
their value of $20,000 as losses on their joint tax return. (See R.
30; T. 265-70; 155-56) To hold that no transfer occurred would not
only allow the Midgleys to receive the benefit of writing off the
losses for the stock on the joint tax returns, but would as well
relieve David from the note and David and Melanie from the mortgage
signed to secure. This would put them into a can't lose situation
and Mrs. Thomas into a can't win situation.
For a contract to be valid, there must be consideration given
by both parties.

At every stage of the relationship between Mrs.

Thomas and the Midgleys, consideration was given by both parties.
It is uncontroverted that Mrs. Thomas made an initial investment of
$20,000 for which she received 200 shares of stock.
7

Mrs. Thomas then gave her 200 shares of stock to David Midgley
for which she received a promissory note and a mortgage to secure
such note. (T. 260-61; 274)

Both Mrs. Thomas and David Midgley

testified that this assignment was made to the Midgleys. (T. 16-17;
258-263)

Benefits were conferred to both parties in each of these

transactions.
The trial court in this matter decided that in the second
transfer, the assignment of stock in exchange for the note and
mortgage, was invalid due to lack of delivery and no consideration
given.

The trial court ignored the uncontroverted evidence and

errored in finding as such.
The Court failed to correctly find that even though defects
may have been present in the assignment and/or delivery of stock,
the clear intent and performance by David Midgley and Ms. Thomas
would correct the defects creating a valid transfer by which they
should be bound.

To hold otherwise would violate the equitable

powers that the Court possesses.
Therefore, the promissory note signed by David Midgley and the
mortgage signed by David and Melanie Midgley are valid and Ms.
Thomas should be entitled to enforce them in order to satisfy the
debt owed.
II.

A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AN INSTALLMENT PAYMENT ON A PROMISSORY
NOTE CONTAINING AN OPTIONAL ACCELERATION CLAUSE ARISES WHEN
THE INSTALLMENT IS NOT PAID. AN OPTIONAL ACCELERATION CLAUSE
WILL NOT SELF-EXECUTE AND MUST BE ACTIVATED BY AN AFFIRMATIVE
ACT ON THE PART OF THE HOLDER.
This Court did not address this issue in its decision due to

the fact that it dismissed Appellants claim to the $20,000 note due
8

to "failure of consideration". The Court on rehearing must address
this issue due to the following considerations.
The trial court initially ruled against Ms. Thomas in its
enforcement of the $20,000 note against David Midgley because the
Court determined that the optional acceleration clause contained in
the note was "deemed" to have been exercised by Ms. Thomas.

The

finding was made despite that fact that Ms. Thomas made no attempt
whatsoever to exercise this acceleration clause.

Making such a

finding, and applying the statute of limitations defense pled by
another defendant in the action to David Midgley, the trial court
ruled after the Plaintiff's case in chief that the $20,000 note was
therefore unenforceable against David Midgley by reason of the
statute of limitations.
At the completion of the trial, the trial additionally found
that the $20,000 note was unenforceable as against David Midgley
because there was a failure of consideration.

However, as was

analyzed in the Section I of this Petition, there is no "failure of
consideration" for the $20,000 promissory note signed by David
Midgley as in pertains to David Midgley.
As such, the Court must address the issue presented in the
original

Appellant's

interpretation of

Brief

relating

to

the

trial

court's

"optional" acceleration clause and the trial

court's determination that the acceleration clause was "deemed" to
have been exercised.
The Petitioner requests that the Court review the Section I of
the

Appellant's

Brief

as

it

analyzes
9

in

detail

this

issue.

However, the Petitioner will provide a brief

summary

in this

Petition.
The $20,000 promissory note contained an acceleration clause
which in part stated:
"If the holder deems herself insecure or if default be
made in payment of the whole or any part of any
installment at the time when or place where the same
becomes due and payable as aforesaid, then the entire
unpaid balance with interest as afforded, shall, at the
election of the holder and without notice of said
election, at once become due and payable..." (emphasis
added) (Exhibit #27).
This type of clause is known as an "optional" acceleration clause.
These clauses were created for the benefit of the holder of the
note and provides the holder with the opportunity,
desires,

to

immediately.

accelerate

the

note

making

it

due

if she so

and

payable

However, if the holder does nothing and/or has no

desire to accelerate the note, the clause remains dormant and the
note is treated as a normal installment note with periodic payment
due dates.
The

trial

court,

however,

wrongly

interpreted

that

this

clause, without any act by Ms. Thomas, accelerated the entire note
due and payable upon the first default (cause of action) on August
18, 1978.

In so doing, the trial court further erroneously held

that the six year Statute of Limitations

(78-12-23 Utah Code

annotated) which bars recovery for any "cause of action" on a
written obligation was applicable to the entire accelerated note.
The trial court's determination that the acceleration clause
found in the promissory note signed by David Midgley automatically

10

matured the entire obligation upon the default of the first payment
was incorrect and must be reversed.
In light of the existing facts and applicable case law as set
forth in Appellant1s Brief, the acceleration clause embodied in the
promissory note held by Mrs. Thomas was clearly optional.

Because

Mrs. Thomas did not elect to exercise her option, the note was not
accelerated.

The failure to make an installment payment is a cause

of action which triggers an individual statute of limitations as to
the past due installments.

Therefore, Ms. Thomas is barred from

recovering only those annual interest installment payments whose
individual statute of limitations have run.

All other installment

payments do not violate the statute of limitations and Mrs. Thomas
is entitled to those payments. Further, as is in the contention of
Ms. Thomas, the statute of limitations' defense should not be
applied to David Midgley's obligations.

(See below for analysis)

III. THE DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE WHICH MUST BE PLED BY THE DEFENDANT CLAIMING SUCH AS
A DEFENSE OR SUCH DEFENSE IS DEEMED WAIVED.
This Court failed to address this issue in its Memorandum
Decision.

The Court indicated that the Appellant did not appeal

from the portion of the judgment relating to the $10,150 promissory
note. This is not the case.

Ms. Thomas did appeal this portion of

the judgment arguing that the trial court erroneously applied the
statute

of

limitations

defense

to

David

Midgley.

Such

an

application of affirmative defense to a defendant who did not plead
the same is erroneous.

Ms. Thomas did appeal this issue in the
11

Appellant's

Brief

and

this Court

must

address

this

issue

on

rehearing.
Once again, please review Section II of Appellant's Brief
where this issue is analyzed in more detail.

However, excerpts

from the Appellant's Brief are provided here in this Petition in
summary form.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state that the defense of
statute of limitations is classified as an affirmative defense. As
such, the Rules require that these affirmative defenses must be set
forth "in pleading to a preceding pleading." (URCP 8(c)).

The

Rules

and

go

on

to

state

that

"a party

waives

all

defenses

objections which he does not present either by motion . . . or in
his answer or reply."

(URCP 12(h)).

In this case, David Midgley, being separated from and acting
independent from Melanie Midgley Short, did not plead at any time
in his Answer (see R. 30) or by a motion the statute of limitations
as a defense to the claims against him.

Rather, he acknowledged

that the money was owed to Ms. Thomas.

Melanie Midgley, being

separated from and acting independent from David Midgley, did raise
in her pleadings the statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense. (See R. 18)
Judge

Rigtrup

decided,

as

a

matter

of

law,

that

the

affirmative defense of statute of limitations pled by Melanie
Midgley applied as well to David Midgley. (R. 110)
questioned

as to

such a holding,

Judge Rigtrup

After being
the next day

acknowledged that there may be no legal basis for such a decision.
12

Addressing this issue he stated, "I reached a conclusion.

Whether

that's right or wrong, perhaps might be novel." (R. 112)
It is well established that each defendant to an action must
raise the affirmative defense of

statute of

responsive pleading or it is deemed waived.

limitations

in a

David Midgley acting

independently chose not to raise such a defense and therefore
cannot be granted the protection of such defense by the independent
acts of a separate defendant.

The holding by the trial court that

the statute of limitations barred recovery against David Midgley as
to both promissory notes was in error and must be reversed.
IV.

MELANIE MIDGLEY AND DAVID MIDGLEY EXECUTED A VALID MORTGAGE
ALLOWING THEIR INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY TO ACT AS COLLATERAL
ON THE $20,000 NOTE SIGNED BY DAVID MIDGLEY.
This Court states in its Memorandum Decision that Melanie

Midgley by signing the mortgage would be an "accommodation maker"
for the promissory note.
$20,000

promissory

note

The Court, however, ruled that the
was

invalid

because

of

failure

of

consideration, thus vitiating the mortgage. As was analyzed above,
consideration was given by at a minimum David Midgley and an
enforceable promissory note was created as between David Midgley
and Ms. Thomas.

As such, the mortgage is not vitiated, but is

enforceable against the interests of David Midgley and Melanie
Midgley.
Melanie Midgley testified that she was at the meeting in Mr.
Kent Larsen's office and understood that an assignment of stock and
promissory note were to be drawn up. (T. 139-40; 143; 155) Melanie
Midgley testified that she had seen the promissory note and that
13

she signed the mortgage which was used to secure the promissory
note. (T. 142)
For more detail regarding this issue, please review the
analysis found in Section IV of the Appellant's brief. However, in
summary, with this valid promissory note and the Court's correct
determination that Melanie Midgley is an accommodator of the note,
Ms. Thomas is therefore entitled to foreclose the mortgage which is
collateral for the promissory note.

CONCLUSION
As has been discussed above, the trial court errored in
determining that the acceleration clause contained in the $20,000
promissory note was automatic in nature.

The acceleration clause

was in fact optional and Ms. Thomas did not elect to accelerate the
note.

The trial court errored in deeming the promissory note

accelerated thereby extinguishing Ms. Thomas's claim due to the
statute of limitations.

This determination must be addressed and

reversed on rehearing.
The trial court held

that the promissory

note was not

enforceable as to David Midgley because it was time barred by the
statute of limitations.
to

the

acceleration

This Court, by reversing the decision as
clause,

would

therefore

reinstate

the

promissory note as to David Midgley which is secured by a valid
mortgage signed by both David Midgley and Melanie Midgley.
With

respect

to the

statute

of

limitations

affirmative

defense, the Court must also reverse the trial court's application
14

of such a defense to David Midgley who did not assert it. There is
no

legal

basis

for

such

an

application.

By

combination with the reversal as to the optional

so

doing,

in

acceleration

clause in the $20,000 note, all of the note's annual interest
payments

plus

the

principle

amount

recoverable against David Midgley.

would

be

enforceable

and

This reversal regarding the

statute of limitations would also modify the trial court decision
to bar recovery against David Midgley with respect to the $10,000
promissory note.

This would entitle Mrs. Thomas to recover the

entire outstanding balance owed on the $10,000 promissory note
against David Midgley.
Nevertheless, if this Court did apply the affirmative defense
to David Midgley and only reversed as to the optional acceleration
clause and

find consideration

for the $20,000 promissory note

between David Midgley and Ms. Thomas, Ms. Thomas would be barred
from recovering only those annual interest payments that were due
more

than

six

years

before

the commencement

of

this

action.

Regardless of these two alternatives, the enforceable promissory
note is secured by a valid mortgage signed by both David Midgley
and Melanie Midgley.
The Courtf s decision upholding the trial court's finding that
the promissory note was not enforceable due to lack of assignment
and/or delivery must be reversed.

As was discussed in the brief

and this Petition, this was an error as a matter of law.

By

reversing this finding, the promissory note would be enforceable
against David Midgley.
15

As such, the fact remains that Melanie Midgley did sign a
valid mortgage to secure the $20,000 promissory note. As such, the
collateral (mortgage) which she executed to secure the note may be
foreclosed upon to satisfy the balance owed on the note.
Ms. Thomas is therefore entitled to enforcement of the $10,150
promissory note and interest payments against the property and
enforcement against Melanie Midgley for the payments which do not
violate the six year statute of limitations defense which she pled.
Ms. Thomas is likewise entitled to enforcement of the $20,000
promissory note and interest payments against the property.
This petition is hereby certified to be brought in good fail
and not for delay and it respectfully submitted this /Jl
January, 1993.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

Byit*£jJt tf~~ DJjuURobert F. Babcock
Attorney for Petitioner
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day of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, this
of January, 1993 to:
Steven C, Tycksen
Attorney for Respondent
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Beatrice N. Thomas,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 920446-CA

Melanie Midgley; David L.
Midgley; and John Does 1-10,

F I L E D
(January 13, 1993)

Defendants and Appellee,

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:

Robert F. Babcock, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Steven C. Tycksen, Murray, for Appellees

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant, Beatrice Thomas, appeals from a judgment entered
after a bench trial. Thomas sued her son, David Midgley, and his
former wife, Melanie Midgley, on two promissory notes.
Proceedings against David were stayed by his filing of a
bankruptcy petition. As a result, judgment was entered only as
to the claims against Melanie, and Melanie is the sole appellee
before us. We affirm.
Both David and Melanie signed a promissory note in the sum
of $10,500.00 in favor of Thomas, secured by a mortgage on their
then jointly owned home. The note provided for monthly payments
and contained no acceleration clause. The trial court granted
Thomas judgment on this note for all payments which accrued
during the six years prior to filing of her complaint, the date
the statute of limitations expired. Thomas was also awarded a
decree of foreclosure on the property securing the note. Thomas
does not appeal from this portion of the judgment, nor does
Melanie.
A second promissory note in the principal sum of $20,000.00
was signed by David only, but was never delivered to Thomas.
Apparently the original plan was that Thomas would transfer stock
to David and Melanie for the note. Both David and Melanie signed

a mortgage securing the note. The stock was not delivered or
endorsed by Thomas and an assignment of the stock was prepared
but not executed. Testimony differed as to whether the
transaction was ever completed. Melanie testified that it was
not and that a gift was intended by Thomas.
The trial court found Melanie was not liable on the note and
the mortgage was not enforceable on the bases that (1) there was
no consideration for the note; (2) the statute of limitations
barred recovery; and/or (3) the statute of frauds barred recovery
against Melanie. We affirm on the bases that Melanie had no
direct liability on the note because she did not sign it, thus
failing to comply with the statute of frauds,1 and further, that
even if she executed the mortgage as an accommodation maker,
there was no consideration for the note,2 thus vitiating the
mortgage. A trial court's findings of fact must be affirmed
unless they are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). We
will reverse only if the findings are clearly against the weight
of evidence or we are otherwise convinced a mistake has been
made. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1976). In particular, we
give deference to the trial court's determinations of
credibility. Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 473 (Utah
App. 1988). Although the evidence concerning consideration in
this case was disputed, there is sufficient evidence in the
record to support the court's conclusions that the transaction
was not consummated, there was no meeting of the minds, and the
court could fairly infer that Thomas intended a gift to her son.

1. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1) (Supp. 1989); Reagan Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v, Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1984).
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-303

(1990).

We need not,therefore, reach the issue of whether the court
correctly allowed Melanie to assert the statute of limitations on
behalf of David.3
We affirm.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Gregory

Orme, Judge

3. In its findings, the trial court noted that the property
which was to secure the $20,000.00 note was awarded to Melanie in
the divorce proceedings; that David had filed a bankruptcy
petition in which he sought to discharge debts to both his mother
and Melanie; and that "the potential for collusion on the part of
[Thomas] and [David] is obvious and unfair to [Melanie]." For
these reasons, the court found that even though David did not
raise the statute of limitations as a defense in his answer,
Melanie could do so on his behalf, to protect her own interest.

